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INTRODUCTION

If academic freedom is of vital concern to many readers of this
review, it surely lies close to the heart of many in the university
community. Teachers, researchers, and many university administrators
have long recognized the need to police its boundaries and to train close
attention on forces, including alumni pressure, commercialization, and
political correctness, that can endanger it.
Yet relatively few discussions of academic freedom consider indirect
forces that may intrude just as deeply. For example, an otherwise
comprehensive recent symposium' devotes scant treatment to two such
forces, one of which figured prominently in the recent University of
Colorado action against Indian law scholar Ward Churchill.2 Those forces
University Professor of Law & Derrick Bell Fellow, University of Pittsburgh. J.D.,
University of California -Berkeley, 1974.
1. Symposium: Horowitz, Churchill, Columbia-What Next for Academic Freedom?,
77 U. COLO. L. REv. 841 (2006).
2. On the University of Colorado's long-running effort to discipline Churchill, see,
e.g., Kirk Johnson, Colorado U. Chancellor Advises FiringAuthor of Sept. 11 Essay, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2006, at All; Inquiry on Research, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A10;
Kirk Johnson, University Changes Its Focus in Investigation of Professor, N.Y. TIMES,
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are retaliation and selective prosecution.
As readers will recall, Churchill published an inflammatory essay,
entitled "Some People Push Back,",3 on an obscure website one day after
the terrible events of 9/11. In it, he reasoned that Americans should not be
surprised at the terrorists' horrific act, because the U.S. itself had been
visiting terror on Iraq through economic sanctions that had killed thousands
of Iraqi adults and children and tyrannized the citizens of other Muslim
nations by backing anti-democratic governments willing to cooperate with
4
U.S. objectives.
Churchill further posited that many of the victims of the 9/11
conflagration were not entirely innocent. In particular, the CIA agents,
investment bankers, and stockbrokers who worked in the World Trade
Center and profited from U.S. imperialism in the Middle East bore indirect
responsibility for the many deaths associated with it. Comparing their role
to that of members of the Nazi high command whom the United States
charged with war crimes at Nuremberg, Churchill maintained that these
"little Eichmanns" got exactly what they deserved.5
When, years later, Churchill's 9/11 remarks came to light in
connection with a scheduled speech at Hamilton College, they incensed
many members of the American public who found them insensitive and
unpatriotic. 6 Acting at the request of state authorities, including the
governor, the legislature, and the board of regents, the Boulder chancellor
appointed a three-person committee to read everything that Churchill had
written in the course of a long
career to see if any of it, including his 9/11
7
remarks, "crossed the line."
Mar. 26, 2005, at A9 [hereinafter Johnson, University Changes]; Report and
Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Research Misconduct Concerning
Allegations of Research Misconduct by Professor Ward Churchill, June 13, 2006, available
at http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/StandingCmteReport.html (on file with
author) [hereinafter Report & Recommendations]. See also Richard Delgado, Shooting the
Messenger (book review), 30 AM. INDIAN. L. REV. 477 (2006), reviewing WARD
CHURCHILL, ON THE JUSTICE OF ROOSTING CHICKENS (2003) [hereinafter ROOSTING
CHICKENS].
3. Ward Churchill, "Some People Push Back" On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,
available at http://www.darknightpress.org/index.php?i=news&c-recent&view=9 (on file
with author) [hereinafter Push Back].
4. Id. See also ROOSTING CHICKENS, supra note 2, at 5-6, 10-14 (making a similar

claim).
5. Push Back, supra note 3; ROOSTING CHICKENS, supra note 2, at 19-20 (explaining

Churchill's meaning in somewhat less flamboyant terms). See also Delgado, supra note 2,
at 485-87, comparing the two passages.
6. See Michelle York & Mindy Sink, Professoris Assailed by Legislatureand Vandals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at B6.

7. See Press Release, University of Colorado, CU-Boulder Chancellor Releases Report
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When, weeks later, the committee concluded that Churchill's public
comments, although odious, fell within the First Amendment, the
Chancellor charged a second committee with considering whether any of
his writing evidenced academic misconduct. 8 After Churchill's case had
become prime-time news, the university had begun learning of allegations,
some years old, that Churchill had committed plagiarism and other
as an Indian when, in the
scholarly infractions and represented himself
9
one.
not
was
he
rivals,
academic
his
of
view
Several of these charges, including fabrication of an Indian identity,
fell by the wayside, but others are the subject of a university appeal and
seem bound for court.10 It is the relation between the first set of
accusations, based on his 9/11 remarks, and the second, alleging academic
misconduct, that this essay ponders.
When the university filed the second set of charges shortly after
dismissing the first, it was hard to escape the inference that the two events
were related and that the university had filed the academic charges only
upon realizing it could not proceed based on Churchill's 9/11 statements.
Two of the university committees investigating him expressed misgivings
over precisely this issue but concluded that they had no choice but to
One member used the analogy of a traffic stop to
proceed anyway."
2
explain why.'
As she put it, a motorist who is pulled over by a traffic cop because
his car sports a liberal bumper sticker (such as "Impeach Bush") has no

available
at
24,
2005),
Review
(Mar.
on
Churchill
http://www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2005/129.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). The
three-person committee consisted of the chancellor, the law dean, and the dean of arts and
sciences.

Id.

See also WARD CHURCHILL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM/ACADEMIC

FRAUD

(forthcoming 2007) (containing this language).
8. See Johnson, University Changes, supra note 2.

The university's standing

committee on research misconduct appointed an Investigative Committee to consider
whether Churchill committed academic misconduct, see Report & Recommendations, supra
note 2, at 3. For the full May 9, 2006 report of the Investigative Committee, see
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/churchillreport051606.html (hard copy on
file with author) [hereinafter Investigative Report].
9. Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing charges against
Churchill).
10. Id. At the time of writing, a faculty Privilege and Tenure Committee was hearing
testimony (including this author's) on the investigative reports and university's intent to
dismiss Professor Churchill.
11. See Investigative Report, supra note 8, at 3-4; and Ty Gee, Fourth Estate Goes

A WOL, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, May 27, 2006, at A25 (quoting committee chair
Marianne Wesson). See also Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 4-5, 15 (making
similar argument without the motorist analogy).
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text, explaining this argument.
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defense to a ticket if the motorist was, in fact, speeding. The officer's
decision may impinge on the motorist's First Amendment rights to some
extent, but this still gives him no excuse for speeding. 13
Similarly, this member reasoned that the university's motives in
instituting disciplinary procedures against Churchill-indignation over his
September 11 remarks-were irrelevant to the subsequent charges growing
out of his Indian law scholarship. 14 This was so even if, as Churchill
pointed out, most prolific scholars whose work came under such intense
scrutiny would turn out to have committed relatively minor indiscretions
like the ones the university charged him with.' 5
It is this aspect of the Churchill proceeding that I wish to examine in
hopes of shedding light on the concept of selective prosecution and, to a
lesser extent, retaliation, in general. Both doctrines accuse a disciplinary
body with proceeding in bad faith, usually for a worker's exercise of some
protected right. Whistleblower statutes now protect subordinates from
retaliation for filing environmental or workplace complaints. 16
With selective prosecution, the relationship between the precipitating
grievance and the matter actually alleged can be subtler, so that legal
doctrine in this area is relatively underdeveloped. Yet the Churchill case
shows that society may soon need such a doctrine if it is to maintain an
effective system of academic freedom. Without one, administrators overly
attuned to political tides may suppress protected behavior by subjecting a
controversial scholar's work to microscopic examination and filing charges
based on some minor shortcoming that this examination brings to light.
I. THREE MODELS OF SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

A. The Cop and the Bumper Sticker
Selective enforcement may take at least three forms. The first is the
one Ward Churchill's disciplinary committee thought it had before it.
13. Id.
14. Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 3, 15 (explaining that the committee
considered the university's motivations in bringing charges against Churchill irrelevant to
its investigation).
15. See id., Appendix B, Summary of Fallacies in the University of Colorado
Investigative Committee Report of May 9, 2006, by Ward Churchill, at 1, 5-6.
16. See, e.g., Victoria L. Donati & William J. Tarnow, Key Issues and Analysis
Relating to Retaliation and Whistleblower Claims, Practising Law Institute Litigation and

Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 745 PMI/Lit 619 (2006) (reviewing a
wide range of federal and state laws against retaliation against employees); Deborah L.
Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005) (analyzing the relation of retaliation and
antidiscrimination law).
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Here, selective prosecution takes the form of charging an offense that, like
speeding, occurs out in the open and is both incontrovertible and inherently
dangerous. Speeding drivers can kill; society has an unquestioned interest
in deterring motorists who drive too fast, even by a few miles per hour.
Besides, we reason, if a conservative cop tickets a driver whose car
bears a liberal bumper sticker ("Impeach Bush"), the next time a liberal cop
may be the one giving a ticket to the speeder whose car sports a
conservative sticker ("Support Our Troops"). So, things even out in the
long run. Even though more cops may be conservative than liberal, with
the result that motorists with liberal bumper stickers end up bearing a
disproportionate brunt of official displeasure, we do not see the connection
between ticketing and suppression of speech as sufficiently close to warrant
giving either type of driver a defense.
The problem in Ward Churchill's case is that Type A selective
enforcement was not actually what the Colorado committee confronted.
Two much stronger analogies lay close at hand.
B. The Cop and the Black Motorist
Selective enforcement may take on a second, more pernicious form.
Imagine a police officer who follows a practice of pulling over every black
male motorist he sees driving an expensive, late-model car.1 7 Believing
that a high percentage of such drivers are drug dealers or other small-time
crooks, he stops each one and conducts a thorough search. Eventually he
finds something that is arguably contraband-say, a sharpened screwdriver
in the glove compartment-and proceeds to arrest the driver.
Much more problematic than the first type of selective enforcement,
this variety is unlikely to even out over time, since no plausible profile
would subject well-behaved white motorists to similar treatment in our
society. Moreover, the link between being a black male and a drug dealer
is unacceptably weak. Purely statistical, it would target many law-abiding8
black men merely because a small number of their group deal drugs.'
17. For discussion of one variety of Type B selective enforcement-racial profilinggenerally DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK (2002).
18. See JODY ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS
OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable
Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781 (1994)
(discussing statistical, or "reasonable" racism in which whites train scrutiny and
enforcement on blacks in general because they believe them statistically more likely than
other groups to commit crimes). But see Richard Delgado, Black Crime, White Fears: On
the Social Constructionof Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994) (pointing out that black crime
is less dangerous than the white variety).
see
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Unlike speeding, which is dangerous every time, driving while black is not.
It sends a message-racial suspicion-to other blacks that society has
wisely decided to reject.19
Ward Churchill's case shares a disturbing number of features with
Type B selective enforcement. In deciding to comb through "every word
he has written," the university made plain that it was looking for grounds to
bring charges against him personally, not, for example, against all
plagiarists or all historians who accuse the U.S. Army of providing the
Indians with smallpox-infested blankets. 20 Like racial profiling, singling
out an individual for special attention is unlikely to even out over time.
Unlike a cop who stops a motorist for speeding, it is not spontaneous and
isolated, but concerted-the university focuses its full investigative
resources on one individual. And the social risk of a careless footnote or
failure to give credit to another's work is scarcely as serious as driving too
fast on a crowded street. Moreover, it sends a message to the scholarly
community that if they address controversial topics they had better be
prepared for a searching examination of their entire body of work.
C. The Cop and the Gadfly
A final form of selective prosecution targets someone not because of
who she is, but because of what she has done-namely, annoyed local
authorities. Perhaps she has criticized the city council or clashed with the
university president. Perhaps he has opposed a local program, such as
recycling or dog walking, that enjoys wide community support. In
response, the authorities place him under covert investigation. They assign
a police officer to tail his car and ask the sanitation department to check
19. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MNN. L. REV. 265 (1999) (arguing that case law and federal policies
have decisively rejected this position).
20. Telephone interview with David Getches, Dean, University of Colorado Law
School (February 2005) (explaining that the three-person committee, of which he was a
member, set out to read everything that Churchill had written); see also University of
Colorado
at
Boulder
Review
of Churchill
Materials,
Mar. 24,
2005,
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/materials.html (listing the books, articles,
essays, speeches, and interviews that the three-person committee examined); Mike Littwin,
When Going Gets Tough, Hoffman Gets Going, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Mar. 8, 2005, at 7A

(describing the three-person committee as combing Churchill's past speeches); Arthur Kane
and Amy Herdy, Churchill:Heritage Undisputed Meets with CU Committee, DENVER POST,

May 25, 2005, at BI (committee reviewed his writings); Remarks by Interim Chancellor Phil
DiStefano,
http://www.colorado.edu/insidecu/archives/2005/2-8/chancellor.html
("The
Office of the Chancellor will launch and oversee a thorough examination of Professor
Churchill's writings, speeches, tape recordings, and other works") (last visited Mar. 6,
2007).
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whether he is segregating his recyclable trash properly. They encourage
his neighbors to file noise complaints and turn him in if he lets his grass
grow long during a vacation. They ask the IRS to audit his most recent tax
returns.
Though all of us can identity with authorities who lose patience with a
chronically obstructionist citizen, we still would find their response to the
gadfly excessive. Although technically within the legitimate power of the
state-after all, each action is independently justifiable-their response
deploys one part of the Constitution to defeat another. 2 1 Even though each
component is permissible, the investigation's
combined effect violates an
22
implicit norm of governmental fairness.
Churchill's treatment at the hands of the Colorado authorities has
more in common with Types B and C selective enforcement (which are
impermissible) than it does with Type A (which is permissible). As
mentioned, the second group of charges against him did not grow
spontaneously out of a readily observed public action. They were directed
at a single individual; the university went looking for them; and they are
not likely to "even out" over time. And because most of us can imagine
ourselves in Churchill's shoes, they send the message that one should not
say anything calculated to offend the authorities unless one is prepared to
undergo searching examination.
II.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR UNCONVENTIONAL

SCHOLARSHIP

A second issue in cases like Ward Churchill's is the appropriate
standard of review. Scholarly transgressions can, of course, arise in
24
23
conventional fields such as presidential history or constitutional theory,
where they rarely lead to serious discipline. For example, Harvard Law
21. Viz., it deploys the Executive Branch, charged under the Constitution with
enforcing the laws, against the Bill of Rights, which protects individual values including
privacy and freedom of speech.
22. See, e.g., Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977) (noting that to prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that his or her constitutionally protected conduct was a
substantial or motivating factor in defendant's adverse action).
23. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Author Goodwin Resigns from Pulitzer Board, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A9 (describing plagiarism charges brought against prominent
presidential historian Doris Keams Goodwin).
24. See Law Professor is Reproached,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2005, at A14; Sara Rimer,
When Plagiarism'sShadow Falls on Admired Scholars, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2004, at B9
(describing charges of plagiarism against Harvard constitutional law scholar Laurence
Tribe). See also RICHARD POSNER, THE LITrLE BOOK OF PLAGIARISM (2007) (arguing that
plagiarism is generally not a serious offense).
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School recently received allegations of plagiarism by two highly regarded
scholars, Laurence Tribe and Charles Ogletree, neither of whom was
writing about a controversial subject.2 5 Each pleaded simple negligence,
one in the failure to supervise the work of a research assistant, 26 and
apologized. Neither had aroused the authorities' ire by making statements
about 9/11; both were in good standing at their schools. Neither received
any form of public discipline.
Other times an author like Ward Churchill will have given the
establishment some recent cause for offense. In these cases, the authorities
will often not target the offending speech directly, realizing that this would
trigger the First Amendment, but will comb through his writings in search
of some unrelated transgression.
If the scholar, like Ward Churchill, has spent a lifetime engaged in
social criticism, these transgressions, like the underlying ground for official
displeasure, are apt to stem from passages about governmental misconduct.
In the Colorado case, two of the allegations charged factual errors in
Churchill's account of a pair of historical incidents of deliberate smallpox
transmission, 27 while others had to do with his interpretation of two federal
statutes, one of which (the Indian Allotment Act) 28 Churchill labeled a
"blood quantum" measure similar to Hitler's Nuremberg Laws. 2 9 Four of
the six charges against him thus arose from his writings on governmental
impropriety.
What standard of review should apply in such cases?
A. When the Scholar is Investigating GovernmentalMisconduct
Every scholar who investigates governmental misconduct should
enjoy wide latitude. In the related area of First Amendment law, one finds
the rule that the government may not sue for defamation. 30 Even if the
charges of an investigative reporter, for example, turn out to be untrue, the
25. See Rimer, supra note 24 (describing plagiarism charges brought against Harvard
law professor Charles Ogletree).
26. See sources cited notes 22-23, supra.
27. See Report & Recommendations, supra note 2, at 6-7 (summarizing charges
against Churchill).
28. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, codified at 25 U.S.C. 331 et
seq.

29. Id.
30. E.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964); Curtis Publ'g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (stating that "history dictated extreme caution in
imposing liability"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786-87, 862-66

(2d ed. 1988). On the background leading up to Sullivan, see Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan
Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1223

(1992).
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government will go without recourse. We strike the balance in this fashion
because speech by which citizens call government to account lies at the
heart of the First Amendment. 3 1 Statements that would be actionable if
leveled against an ordinary citizen are beyond redress if the target is the
government.
The law of human experimentation exhibits a similar asymmetry. All
campuses that conduct federally-sponsored research are required to
maintain human subjects protection committees (sometimes called
"institutional review boards" or "human research committees") that
evaluate proposals for university research that uses human beings as
subjects of study.32 The committees are charged with assuring that
researchers minimize the risk of harm to such33 subjects, protect their
confidentiality, and secure their informed consent.
One of the relatively few exceptions to these requirements is research
into the performance of a governmental agency or program. Here, a "fast
track" procedure enables the investigator to secure permission more readily
than when the proposal contemplates research using prisoners, children, or
members of another vulnerable group. 34 Thus a researcher who sought to
investigate misconduct in connection with a campus program such as
affirmative action or intercollegiate sports would receive a near-free pass.
Because the research looks to establish governmental accountability and is
an example of "research up" rather than "research down," it is a candidate
for quick approval.
A third area that will be familiar to readers with backgrounds in

31. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 786-87.

See generally Michael Kent Curtis, Monkey

Trials: Science, Defamation, and the Suppression of Dissent, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.

507 (1995) (criticism receives highest protection when aimed at the most powerful).
32. For the federal regulations that establish institutional review boards, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101 (2005). For a discussion of their operation, see CARL COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS

3 (2005). For Colorado's
regulations, see University of Colorado at Denver, Policies and Procedures of the Human
Subjects Research Committee, available at, http://thunderl.cudenver.edu/osp/HSRCpol.pdf
(last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
33. See, e.g., University of Colorado, Human Research Committee, Standard Operating
Procedures, available at http://www.colorado.eduiVCResearch/HRC/SOPTOC.html;
Colorado, Human Research Committee Guidance Documents,
University of
http://www.colorado.eduVCResearch/HRC/guidance.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
34. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2005) (exempting research examining the performance of
elected or public officials, and projects which evaluate public benefit programs). On the
protection of vulnerable groups, see University of Colorado, Human Research Committee,
Standard Operating Procedures, Protocol 21 - Vulnerable Subjects, available at:
http://www.colorado.eduNCResearch/HRC/downloads/HRC21.doc (last visited Mar. 7,
2007).
AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS ch.
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literary theory is satire. 35 Here, the mechanism is self-selection, not
official enforcement, but the compliance rate is nearly one hundred percent.
The practice to which I refer is that of the classical satirists, such as
Voltaire or Jonathan Swift, or, in our time, Russell Baker, of reserving their
slings and arrows for the high and the mighty-kings, nobles, and others
who abused power or puffed themselves up self-importantly. They rarely,
if ever, used their wit to ridicule beggars, cripples, orphans, or others of
lower status than themselves. A root word of humor is humus, bringing
down, close to earth; one recalls how Roman emperors would employ
members of their retinue to accompany them during victory parades,
36
whispering in their ear, "[t]hou art but a man."
This practice captures the same asymmetry that we found in free
speech law and human-subjects experimentation. Power exerted downward
is simply more problematic than when exerted in the opposite direction.
Consequently, a scholar, such as Ward Churchill, 37 Noam Chomsky, 38 or
Howard Zinn, 39 who investigates governmental misconduct should enjoy
freedom from prosecution for all but the most egregious errors.
B. Unscholarly Sources: The Role of the Official Account
A further reason for affording the scholar investigating governmental
impropriety wide leeway is simply that his burden is heavier than most.
History is always written by the victors, so that the official account of any
period is apt to downplay governmental criminality or racism. 40 Thus, the
historian whose instinct tells him that something is amiss with the official
account will, of necessity, be forced to resort to unconventional sources,
such as oral history, letters, diaries, or other "stories from below. '4 1 To an
unsympathetic investigator, these may bespeak an unscholarly attitude.
Churchill's committee report, for example, took him to task for using

35. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Scorn, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.

1061, 1067-71 (1994).
36. Id. at 1091. See also Leslie Kim Treiger, Note, ProtectingSatire Against Libel
Claims: A New Reading of the First Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98 YALE L.J. 1215

(1989) (noting the need to extend constitutional protection of satirical speech because of its
vital role in political and social criticism).
37. See e.g., A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND DENIAL IN THE
AMERICAS 1492 TO THE PRESENT (1997).
38. See e.g., HEGEMONY OR SURVIVAL: AMERICA'S QUEST FOR GLOBAL DOMINANCE

(2003).
39. See e.g., A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-PRESENT (2003).
40. See e.g., ALFRED F. YOUNG, LIBERTY TREE: ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN

REVOLUTION 1-23 (2006).
41. Id.
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such unconventional materials, 42 when, in fact, they might well have been
the only ones at his disposal. To draw an analogy to the human-subjects
review process, his committee gave him the precise opposite of a "free
pass." It treated his efforts to call government to task with the aid of
unconventional sources as proof of scholarly ineptitude, when those
sources might well have been the best ones available to anyone pursuing
his line of inquiry.
CONCLUSION

If scholars never took risks, paradigms would change very slowly. It
they refrained from criticizing government, books such as Peter Irons'
"Justice at War,"4 3 Vincent Harding's "There is a River' 44 or Rachel
Carson's "Silent Spring" 4 5 would not have been written. If society is to
rely on academic researchers to investigate governmental misconduct, it
must be prepared to afford them wide leeway. 46 It must be alert for
censorship that takes the form of retaliation or selective prosecution. And
it must exercise special vigilance when powerful constituencies are
demanding retribution and other, more cautious scholars are waiting in the
wings to see what happens.

42. See Investigative Report, supra note 8, at 94 (accusing Churchill of using
American Indian oral traditions "disingenuously"); see also id. at 6 (noting that
"interdisciplinary work and.., ethnic studies... may require an even stronger fealty to
standards" of conventional scholarship); Id. at 45-46 n.98 (rejecting any suggestion that
scholars challenging historical beliefs may take liberties with evidence and presentation).
43. PETER IRONS,

JUSTICE AT WAR:

THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN

INTERNMENT (1983) (re-examining official evidence for wartime internment of Japanese).
44. VINCENT HARDING, THERE IS A RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN

AMERICA (1993) (recounting history of abolitionism and the civil rights movement).
45. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (advancing early case for
environmentalism).
46. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the State of New York, the Supreme Court
noted that academic freedom is a "special concern of the First Amendment" because the
country's future depends on "leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange
of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues [rather] than through any kind
of authoritative selection,"' 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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